Lezioni d’Europa 2023

Il 2 marzo torna “Lezioni d’Europa”, il tradizionale ciclo di incontri su temi d’interesse per la vita dei cittadini dell’Europa condotti da esperti di vari settori della vita sociale, economica, ambientale, ecc.

Nove webinar della durata di un’ora e mezzo ciascuno (ore 10-11.30) organizzati da cinque Centri EUROPE DIRECT in collaborazione con enti e istituzioni nazionali ed europei e ospitati sulla piattaforma del Formez PA.

È possibile partecipare all’intero percorso oppure alle singole iniziative.

Calendario lezioni

02/03/2023 - Lezione 1: La Comunità politica europea: origini e prospettive
09/03/2023 - Lezione 2: I nuovi Fondi europei 2021-2027: come e dove informarsi
16/03/2023 - Lezione 3: Le opportunità di finanziamento del programma “Cittadini, uguaglianza, diritti e valori (CERV)”
30/03/2023 - Lezione 4: I giovani e i nuovi fabbisogni di competenze strategiche: l’iniziativa di inserimento sociale ALMA
13/04/2023 - Lezione 5: La mobilità come competenza: Erasmus+ per le scuole
20/04/2023 - Lezione 6: Patto europeo per il clima: focus su mobilità sostenibile
04/05/2023 - Lezione 7: Patto europeo per il clima e crisi energetica
11/05/2023 - Lezione 8: I finanziamenti europei nel settore digitale
18/05/2023 - Lezione 9: Europrogettazione: programmi, progetti e rendicontazione

Info su programma e iscrizioni: https://www.europedirect.unisi.it/lezioni-deuropa/lezioni-deuropa-2023/
Brussels, 15 February 2023

For almost one year now, Russia's war of aggression has been sowing death and destruction. Putin is not only waging a brutal war on the battlefield but he is also viciously targeting civilians. The aggressor has to pay for this. Today, we are turning up the pressure with a 10th package of sanctions.

First, we propose further export bans worth more than €11 billion, to deprive the Russian economy of critical technology and industrial goods. For maximum impact, we are targeting many industrial goods that Russia needs, and that it cannot get through backfilling by third countries. Vital goods such as electronics, specialized vehicles, machine parts, spare parts for trucks and jet engines. And we are targeting goods for the construction sector which can be directed to Russia's military, such as antennas or cranes.

Second, we will further restrict the export of dual use goods and advanced tech goods. We propose controls on 47 new electronic components that can be used in Russian weapons systems, including drones, missiles, helicopters. And on specific rare earth materials and thermal cameras. With this, we have banned all tech products found on the battlefield. And we will make sure they don't find other ways to get there. This is why, for the first time ever, we are adding third country entities to the Russia dual use sanctions. Iran's Revolutionary Guards have been providing Russia with Shahed drones to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Therefore, we are now adding seven Iranian entities to our dual use regime. They are now under a complete ban to sell sensitive items to Russia. And we stand ready to list further Iranian and other third country entities that are providing sensitive technology to Russia. This should act as a strong deterrent to other companies and international traders.

My third point is about Russia's propaganda machine. Putin is also waging war in the public space, with an army of propagandists and disinformation networks. They are spreading toxic lies to polarise our societies. So we are proposing to list Putin's propagandists as well as additional military and political commanders. High Representative Borrell will provide you more information on the listings we are proposing today.

We now have in place the toughest sanctions ever introduced by the European Union. And we have to ensure that they are strictly applied. Therefore, our 10th package introduces new measures to prevent circumvention. This is my fourth point. We will track oligarchs trying to hide or to sell their assets to escape sanctions. And together with Member States we will set up an overview of all frozen assets of the Russian central bank held in the EU. We need to know where these are located and how much they are worth. This is crucial in view of the possible use of public Russian assets to fund reconstruction in Ukraine.

And finally, we are working closely with Member States, operators and partner countries to tackle circumvention. Our special envoy David O'Sullivan is reaching out to third countries, to ensure strict implementation of sanctions and prevent circumvention. And next week, we will organise a Sanctions Coordinators Forum, gathering our international partners and Member States, to strengthen enforcement efforts. Together, we are tightening the screws on Russia more and more. I call on the Member States to adopt this new package of sanctions swiftly. Our aim is to have, together with our G7 partners, further significant sanctions in place by February 24 - exactly one year after Putin launched his imperial war.

The strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation has been signed and presented on the 16 June 2022 by 34 signatories who have joined the revision process of the 2018 Code.

The new Code aims to achieve the objectives of the Commission’s Guidance presented in May 2021, by setting a broader range of commitments and measures to counter online disinformation.

The 2022 Code of Practice is the result of the work carried out by the signatories. It is for the signatories to decide which commitments they sign up to and it is their responsibility to ensure the effectiveness of their commitments’ implementation. The Code is not endorsed by the Commission, while the Commission set out its expectations in the Guidance and considers that, as a whole, the Code fulfils these expectations.

Signatories committed to take action in several domains, such as; demonetising the dissemination of disinformation; ensuring the transparency of political advertising; empowering users; enhancing the cooperation with fact-checkers; and providing researchers with better access to data.

Recognising the importance to make the Code future-proof, signatories agreed to establish a framework for further collaboration through a permanent Task-force. The Code also comes with a strengthened monitoring framework based on qualitative reporting elements and service-level indicators measuring the effectiveness of its implementation. Signatories will set up a Transparency Centre, providing a clear overview to the public of the policies they put in place to implement their commitments, and will update it regularly with the relevant data.

The Strengthened Code

The Code of Practice on Disinformation is a first-of-its kind tool through which relevant players in the industry agreed - for the first time in 2018 - on self-regulatory standards to fight disinformation.

Its revision process was launched in June 2021 and, after the signature and presentation of the revised Code on 16 June 2022, the new Code will become part of a broader regulatory framework, in combination with the legislation on Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising and the Digital Services Act. For signatories that are Very Large Online Platforms, the Code aims to become a mitigation measure and a Code of Conduct recognised under the co-regulatory framework of the DSA.

The strengthened Code of Practice contains 44 commitments and 128 specific measures, in the following areas.

- Demonetisation: cutting financial incentives for purveyors of disinformation
- The strengthened Code aims to ensure that purveyors of disinformation do not benefit from advertising revenues. Signatories commit to stronger measures avoiding the placement of advertising next to disinformation, as well as the dissemination of advertising containing disinformation. The Code also sets up a more effective cooperation among the players of the advertising sector, allowing stronger joint action.

The EU strategy for sustainable and circular textiles addresses the production and consumption of textiles, whilst recognising the importance of the textiles sector. It implements the commitments of the European Green Deal, the new circular economy action plan and the industrial strategy.

Textiles are the fabric of everyday life - in clothes and furniture, medical and protective equipment, buildings and vehicles. However, urgent action is needed as their impact on the environment continues to grow. EU consumption of textiles has, on average, the fourth highest impact on the environment and climate change, after food, housing and mobility. It is also the third highest area of consumption for water and land use, and fifth highest for the use of primary raw materials and greenhouse gas emissions.

By looking at the entire lifecycle of textile products and proposing actions to change how we produce and consume textiles, the Strategy presents a new approach, addressing these issues in a harmonised manner.

https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/textiles-strategy_en

Circular economy action plan

The European Commission adopted the new circular economy action plan (CEAP) in March 2020. It is one of the main building blocks of the European Green Deal, Europe’s new agenda for sustainable growth. The EU’s transition to a circular economy will reduce pressure on natural resources and will create sustainable growth and jobs. It is also a prerequisite to achieve the EU’s 2050 climate neutrality target and to halt biodiversity loss.

The new action plan announces initiatives along the entire life cycle of products. It targets how products are designed, promotes circular economy processes, encourages sustainable consumption, and aims to ensure that waste is prevented and the resources used are kept in the EU economy for as long as possible.

It introduces legislative and non-legislative measures targeting areas where action at the EU level brings real added value.

Secondo i trattati dell'UE, i cittadini europei residenti in un paese dell'UE diverso dal proprio, dovrrebbero avere il diritto di partecipare alle elezioni europee e locali alle stesse condizioni dei cittadini di quello paese.

Tuttavia, gli europei che vivono in un altro paese dell'UE continuano ad incontrare ostacoli nell'esercizio dei loro diritti elettorali e la loro partecipazione alle elezioni rimane molto bassa rispetto ai cittadini di quel paese.

Le norme relative alle elezioni europee, così come quelle che regolano la partecipazione alle elezioni municipali per coloro che non sono cittadini di quel paese, differiscono tra i vari Stati membri.

Nel febbraio 2023, il Parlamento europeo ha approvato due proposte nelle quali si chiede agli Stati membri il miglioramento di queste norme.